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International Coalitions and Non-
Militarily Contributing Member States: 
A Perspective from Panama’s Practice 
and the Law of Neutrality 
Alonso E. Illueca 
Abstract: The military actions of an International Coalition 
and the role of its non-military contributing member States 
is yet another fundamental example of international practice 
concerning conflation between jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello. Although International Law proscribes the use of 
force in international relations, membership in an Interna-
tional Coalition engaged in military operations does not 
come without a cost. Non-military contributing member 
States may be regarded as co-belligerents or neutral States 
violating the laws of neutrality. This article argues that mere 
membership in a coalition does not amount to co-belliger-
ency. Nevertheless, it claims that membership could entail a 
violation of the laws of neutrality, authorizing the use of 
countermeasures or lawful reprisals. The article analyzes 
the practice of Panama as part of the allies in World War II, 
the coalition of willing in Iraq (2003), and the coalition to 
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counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria (2015). In doing so, it consid-
ers the applicable laws and possible conflicts between jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. 
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Does a State’s mere membership in an international coalition au-
tomatically translate into co-belligerency? Can the State become a 
party to an armed conflict without actually firing a single bullet or 
even providing material support to one of the belligerents? The laws 
of neutrality and recent State practice provide useful guidance in as-
serting that a neutral power’s violation of its status does not ipso 
facto mean co-belligerency. While violations of neutrality, such as 
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openly expressing support for one of the belligerents in an armed 
conflict, may legitimize the aggrieved State (one of the belligerents) 
to adopt countermeasures or undertake lawful reprisals, this viola-
tion should not be understood as a carte blanche for the lawful use 
of force against the State in question. 
This article specifically analyzes the practice of Panama as a 
case study, which consists of joining several coalitions without ac-
tually engaging in armed hostilities. Three cases related to Panama’s 
participation in international coalitions will be analyzed in light of 
the applicable principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. These 
include Panama’s participation in World War II (“WWII”) as a “co-
belligerent”, its incorporation to the United States of America 
(“U.S.”) led coalitions against Iraq in 2003 and against Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”) in 2015. 
The practice of Panama in this regard deserves special consider-
ation as the country lacks a standing army, and it is not or was not 
actively engaged in hostilities in either of the above-mentioned con-
flicts. After the 1989 U.S. military intervention, Panama decided to 
abolish its army.1 Furthermore, in 1994, Panama established, 
through a Constitutional reform,2 the prohibition of the country pos-
sessing an army.3 
After the end of WWII and with the advent of the United Nations 
(“U.N.”), international law was revolutionized with the entry into 
force of the U.N. Charter and the general prohibition on the threat 
or the use of force.4 This prohibition allows only for two general 
exceptions, as specified in the U.N. Charter, which are individual or 
                                                                                                             
 1 RENÉ DE LA PEDRAJA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARMED 
FORCES OF MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 
2000-2014 211 (2014). 
 2 ORLANDO J. PEREZ, POLITICAL CULTURE IN PANAMA: 
DEMOCRACY AFTER INVASION 93-94 (2011) (elaborating on the process for 
abolishing the army and reforming the constitution). 
 3 CONST. POL. PAN. [Constitution] art. 310 (1972) am. 1994. 
 4 U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶4; see, e.g., Corfu Channel (Alb. v. U.K.), Judgment, 
1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35 (April 9); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶181-95 (June 
27); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. Rep. 226, 244, ¶37-38 (July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 
136, ¶87 (July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Uganda 2005 Rep. 168, ¶148, 162-65 (December 19). 
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collective self-defense5 and collective action sanctioned by the U.N. 
Security Council (“UNSC”).6 With this general prohibition in place, 
contemporary jus ad bellum was established, regulating the resort to 
armed force in inter-state relations.7 Contemporary jus ad bellum 
renders declarations of war as unnecessary tools for unilaterally ad-
vancing the State’s national policy interests and, arguably, as illegal 
threats to the use of force.8 
As evidenced by the participation of several States9 in WWII 
through non-military contributions, a State could become a co-bel-
ligerent in the course of an armed conflict without actually engaging 
in military hostilities or using force.  Did this state of affairs survive 
the establishment of contemporary jus ad bellum? The answer to this 
question lies in a legal analysis based in the principles of jus in bello, 
i.e., international humanitarian law (“IHL”), and jus ad bellum.10  
While jus in bello generally regulates conduct beyond the scope of 
jus ad bellum - such as civil wars and protection of civilians during 
armed conflict - sometimes certain principles of such areas of inter-
national law operate concurrently.11 The present article aims at ex-
plaining the legal consequences of a State’s participation in an in-
ternational military coalition, in the specific circumstance where 
such State does not resort to the use of armed force (jus ad bellum). 
This article does not intend to settle questions of State responsi-
bility for military actions or problems associated with differing 
                                                                                                             
 5 U.N. Charter art. 51; see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 
I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶51 (November 6). 
 6 See generally U.N. Charter art. 39-51. 
 7 Robert Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad 
Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 
47, 49, 64–65 (2008) (explaining the advent of contemporary Jus Ad Bellum). 
 8 U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶4; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES VOL. 
73, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 365 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Dun-
can eds., 1999) [Hereinafter THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
 9 Allied powers, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/topic/Allied-Powers-international-alliance (listing as allied powers 
States such as Uruguay, Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Bolivia 
and Ecuador). 
 10 Sloane, supra note 7, at 67-68 (explaining the jus ad bellum-in bello rela-
tionship in the U.N. Charter era). 
 11 But see Id. at 67-68 (stating that presently jus ad bellum and in bello prin-
ciples can often operate concurrently). 
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treaty obligations. The main question is context specific, i.e., an on-
going-armed conflict, and concerns a State not participating in hos-
tilities. It focuses on whether the actions of such State (violations of 
the laws of neutrality) are grave enough under IHL to drag it into 
the armed conflict as a co-belligerent. 
In order to uniformly address the questions presented, this article 
is organized in five parts: this brief introduction, three legal argu-
mentation sections and a conclusion. Section I provides an overview 
of Panama’s incorporation to the above-mentioned military coali-
tions and the reasons provided for such incorporation, it also char-
acterizes the conflicts in which such coalitions were/are engaged as 
either International Armed Conflict or Non-International Armed 
Conflict. Section II considers relevant concepts of the law of neu-
trality in international armed conflicts, such as violations of neutral-
ity and co-belligerent designations. Section III suggests that Panama 
should be considered as either a co-belligerent state or a state that 
violated the laws of neutrality in the above mentioned conflicts. It 
also describes the legal consequences for Panama and the rights of 
the aggrieved belligerents vis-à-vis Panama. 
II. INCORPORATION TO INTERNATIONAL COALITIONS 
In the last fifteen years, Panama has joined two international co-
alitions without contributing military forces to their strategic objec-
tives.12 In both occasions the President adopted a unilateral decision, 
without the prior approval of the National Assembly (legislative 
power).13 Moreover, it failed to present a concise legal reasoning for 
such decisions, along with an analysis of its immediate and future 
consequences.14 One factor that has been repeatedly ignored is the 
impact that the applicable rules of IHL may have in elucidating the 
                                                                                                             
 12 ‘Coalition of the Willing’, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 27, 2003, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/03/27/coalition-of-the-
willing/cdb82022-5b70-4650-9b8b-2f6f544e4cdd/?utm_term=.79fe8e974bb3; 
Elisa Vásquez, Panama Joins Coalition against ISIS Despite Having No Army, 
PANAM POST, Feb. 9, 2015, https://panampost.com/elisa-vasquez/2015/02/09
/panama-joins-coalition-against-isis-despite-having-no-army/. 
 13 Id. (in both cases Panama’s Executive Power only issued an official state-
ment on the decision without prior participation or approval by the legislature). 
 14 Id. (the official statements can be better framed as mere statements of sup-
port due to the absence of any concrete reasoning or analysis). 
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consequences of Panama’s membership in such coalitions, which 
could affect its status as a neutral State in those conflicts.15 Particu-
larly, the rules of neutrality have been sidelined and the analysis has 
been simplified to a mere question of jus ad bellum.16  Nonetheless, 
it is Panama’s own practice during WWII as part of the Allied block 
and a co-belligerent that best illustrates the special consideration 
that should be given to jus in bello, and, in particular, the laws of 
neutrality, whenever jus ad bellum is not effectively observed and 
implemented.17 
Prior to analyzing the consequences of Panama’s actions in the 
last fifteen years, it is necessary to describe and analyze its partici-
pation in three military coalitions: the Allies (WWII), the Coalition 
of the Willing, and the Coalition to counter the ISIL. In doing, spe-
cial consideration will be provided to the purposes and objectives of 
these coalitions. Additionally, the role of Panama as a member will 
be analyzed. Lastly, each of the conflicts in question will be charac-
terized as either international or non-international in light of IHL. 
a. The Allies and WWII 
On December 10, 1941, three days after the Empire of Japan 
(“Japan”) attack on the United States (“U.S.”) at Pearl Harbor in 
Hawaii, the Panamanian Legislature enacted Law 104, which de-
clared war against Japan.18 In the same legal instrument, the Execu-
tive Power was authorized to declare war against any power allied 
to Japan.19 Subsequently, on December 12, 1941, the Executive 
Power enacted two Decrees in which Panama declared war to Ger-
many20 and Italy21. 
                                                                                                             
 15 See, Paul Seger, The Law of Neutrality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 248 (Andrew Clapham 
& Paola Gaeta, eds., 2014) (for an introduction to the law of neutrality). 
 16 See, Okimoto Keichiro, The Relationship between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus 
in Bello, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
THE USE OF FORCE 1209, 1209-24 (Mark Weller, ed, 2015). 
 17 See, Sloane, supra note 7, at 64 (as WWII occurred prior to the UN Charter 
era, jus in bello was the only applicable body of law at the time). 
 18 Ley no. 104, Dec. 10, 1941, LEG. PAN. (Pan.). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Decreto no. 14, Dec. 12, 1941, LEG. PAN. (Pan.). 
 21 Decreto no. 15, Dec. 12, 1941, LEG. PAN. (Pan.). 
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On January 1, 1942, in the midst of WWII hostilities, the Repub-
lic of Panama, alongside twenty-five other nations, signed the “Dec-
laration by the United Nations.”22 Such a declaration would later 
constitute the basis for and one of the closest antecedents to the 
United Nations organization.23 The text provides for a declaration of 
war by the signatory States against the members of the Tripartite 
Pact - Germany, Italy and Japan.24 Additionally, it established a col-
lective state of belligerency for all the signatory states given their 
“common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to sub-
jugate the world,” and the commitment they undertook to cooperate 
among themselves and not to make any separate armistices or peace 
agreements with the common enemies.25 
Panamanian armed forces were never engaged in military hos-
tilities with any of the members of the Tripartite Pact during 
WWII.26 The only participation in hostilities, if it can be considered 
as such, was the military buildup in areas neighboring the Panama 
Canal after 1941.27 At that time, Panama’s sovereignty over certain 
areas of its territory was contested given that Article III of the Hay-
Bunau-Varilla Treaty granted rights to the U.S. as “if it were the 
sovereign” (sovereign rights) of the so-called Panama Canal Zone.28 
Historic records provide that at the time, the U.S. stationed sixty-
five thousand soldiers in one-hundred thirty-six defense locations at 
                                                                                                             
 22 Declaration by the United Nations (Jan. 1, 1942), THE AVALON 
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale. edu/20th_century/decade03.asp [hereinafter 
Declaration by the United Nations]. 
 23 U.N. DEP’T OF PUB. INFO., THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY, at 3, U.N. Sales 
No. E.08.I.6 (2008). 
 24 Mark Reeves, The Broad, Toiling Masses in all the Continents: Anticolo-
nial Activists and the Atlantic Charter (2014) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Western 
Kentucky University) (on file with TopScholar). 
 25 Declaration by the United Nations, supra note 22. 
 26 STEWART BREWER, BORDERS AND BRIDGES: A HISTORY OF 
U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 109-11 (2006). 
 27 STENSON CONN ET AL., GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND 
ITS OUTPOSTS 344, 353 (2000). 
 28 Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans art. III, Pan.-U.S. art. III Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat. 
2234 [hereinafter Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty]. 
8 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1 
 
the Canal Zone and other parts of Panamanian territory.29 The Fa-
brega-Wilson Treaty provided official permission to the U.S. to oc-
cupy defensive areas in Panamanian territory, apart from the Canal 
Zone, which would terminate one year after the signature of the 
peace treaty ending the war.30 
Additionally, it has been recognized that Germany intended to 
attack the Panama Canal due to the tactical advantage that the infra-
structure represented to the United States.31 The attack plan was 
known as “Operation Pelikan” or “Projekt 14” and was called off in 
1943.32 Similarly, Japan had a plan to attack the Canal with special 
submarines, I-400 Class, in order to halt the U.S. led offensive in the 
Pacific.33 Notwithstanding that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty pro-
vided that “the Canal and its entrances shall be neutral in perpetu-
ity,”34 German and Japanese forces considered the Canal to be a le-
gitimate military objective during the course of WWII.35 It could be 
argued, at the time, that the legitimacy of Germany and Japan’s per-
spective rested on the fact that they were not parties to the Hay-Bu-
nau-Varilla Treaty and therefore, they did not recognize the neutral-
ity of the waterway. Moreover, it should also be considered that 
while the U.S. proclaimed the Canal permanently neutral, its prac-
tice since 1904 was to exercise belligerent rights when engaged in 
                                                                                                             
 29 Reymundo Guardián Guerra, Evolucíon Histórica de la Presencia Militar 
Norteamericana en Panamá [Historical Evolution of the North American Military 
Presence in Panama], in EL CANAL DE PANAMA [THE PANAMA CANAL] 
360, 397-98 (Juan Antonio Tack ed., 1999). 
 30 U.S., Panama Sign Pact on Defense Areas, THE GAZETTE (New York) 
11 (May 19, 1942), https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1917&dat=19420
519&id=72YtAAAAIBAJ&sjid=A4kFAAAAIBAJ&pg=1033,2074155&hl=en. 
 31 LADISLAS FARGO, THE GAME OF FOXES: THE UNTOLD STORY 
OF GERMAN ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT 
BRITAIN DURING WORLD WAR II 51-54 (1971); RENE J. FRANCILLON, 
JAPANESE AIRCRAFT OF THE PACIFIC WAR 294 (1970). 
 32 Id. 
 33 See, e.g., HENRY SAKAIDA ET AL., I-400, JAPAN’S SECRET 
AIRCRAFT CARRYING STRIKE SUBMARINE: OBJECTIVE PANAMA 
CANAL (2006); JOHN GOEGHEGAN, OPERATION STORM: JAPAN’S TOP 
SECRET SUBMARINES AND ITS PLAN TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF 
WORLD WAR II (2014). 
 34 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, supra note 28, at art. XVIII. 
 35 Guerra, supra note 29, at 398. 
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hostilities.36 In World War I, the U.S. had initially proclaimed its 
neutrality, but yielded it with a proclamation of belligerency, which 
was extended to the Canal.37 The U.S. even proceeded to exercise 
belligerent rights in the Canal by seizing six German ships after the 
issuance of its proclamation.38 Considering this precedent and the 
fact that the U.S. effectively closed the Canal to enemy ships once 
it entered into WWII (1941),39 the legitimate military objective ar-
gument gains significant ground. In this sense, due to the strategic 
importance of the Canal for the transit of troops from the Pacific to 
the Atlantic (or vice versa), its destruction or injury would have of-
fered a definite military advantage to the Tripartite Pact.40 
Ralph Smith provides an interesting rationale for rejecting the 
neutrality of a waterway in this context, and ergo supporting its sta-
tus as a legitimate military objective once the State becomes a bel-
ligerent in the conflict.41 He asserts that there is no internationally 
recognized legal authority establishing “rules for preserving the neu-
trality of a body of water within the territorial boundaries of a State 
when the territorial sovereign is not itself neutral.”42 Smith articu-
lates that there is no concept of neutrality applicable to a canal if the 
littoral State (or the State in control of the waterway) becomes a bel-
ligerent.43 Consequently, he argues that such “a ‘regime of neutral-
ity’ in a canal cannot be inviolable, but must give way to properly 
exercised rights of self-defense.”44 
The Panama Canal Zone and sovereign Panamanian territory 
were used during WWII to conduct military exercises, defensive 
                                                                                                             
 36 See, RICHARD BAXTER, VIAS ACUATICAS INTERNACIONALES 
[THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS] 213-216 (Agustín Contin 
trans., UTHEA, 1967) (describing U.S. belligerent acts in the Panama Canal in 
WWI and WWII). 
 37 Ralph Smith, Beyond the Treaties: Limitations on Neutrality in the Pan-
ama Canal, 4 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 18-19 (1978). 
 38 Id. at 19. 
 39 Id. at 19-20. 
 40 See Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives under The Current Jus 
In Bello, 78 INT’L L. STUDIES, 139, 146-47 (2002); Horace Robertson, The 
Principle of the Military Objecitve in the Law of Armed Conflict, 8 U.S. AIR 
FORCE ACADEMY J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 35, 40 (1997). 
 41 Smith, supra note 37, at 13. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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preparations, and for the transit of troops towards Europe or the Pa-
cific.45 Although such portions of Panama’s territory were not under 
its direct control at the time, it should be noted that Panama volun-
tarily leased portions of its territory to the U.S. for the duration of 
the war.46 This was a sufficient ground to consider Panama a party 
to the armed conflict. Moreover, and independent from this lease, 
Panama was already considered a cobelligerent State in WWII be-
cause it issued “war declarations”47 against the Axis powers and 
joined the “Declaration by the United Nations” as a signatory.48 
b. The Coalition of the Willing and the Iraq War of 2003 
On March 27, 2003, the U.S. announced that it had assembled 
an international coalition, comprised of forty-nine states, with the 
purpose of dismantling Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pro-
grams and bringing that country into compliance with several reso-
lutions of the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”).49 The Co-
alition, named by the Bush Administration as the “Coalition of the 
Willing,” was not an operation authorized by the UNSC; rather, it 
was a multilateral effort beyond the legal scope of any international 
organization.50 The press release issued by the White House stated 
that the members of the coalition would contribute to such enterprise 
in different capacities, including: direct military participation, logis-
tical and intelligence support, specialized chemical/biological re-
sponse teams, over-flight rights, humanitarian and reconstruction 
aid, and political support.51  Panama was in the initial list of coalition 
members provided by the White House.52 
                                                                                                             
 45 CONN ET AL., supra note 27, at 301-27. 
 46 Agreement for the Lease of Defense Sites in the Republic of Panama, Pan.-
U.S., May 18, 1942, 57 Stat. 1232 [hereinafter Fabrega-Wilson Treaty]. 
 47 MICHAEL WALSH, ROUND ONE TO THE BARBARIANS 117-19 
(2005) (Panama declared war on Germany and Italy on December 12, 1941 and 
on Japan on December 8, 1941). 
 48 Declaration by the United Nations, supra note 22. 
 49 Press Release, The White House, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition 
Members (March 27, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release – Coalition Members]. 
 50 Raymond Hinnebusch, The Iraq War and International Relations: Impli-
cations for Small States, 19 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT’L AFF. 451, 455-57 
(2006). 
 51 Press Release – Coalition Members, supra note 49. 
 52 Id. 
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i. Panama Joins the Coalition of the Willing 
By way of a Joint Presidential Declaration,53 issued by the heads 
of State of Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras, these 
Central-American States offered their support to the ultimatum prof-
fered by the U.S. against Iraq to disarm and comply with relevant 
UNSC Resolutions, or assume grave consequences.54 The Declara-
tion expressed particular regret for Iraq’s defiance and material 
breach of UNSC Resolution 1441.55 The Heads of State indicated 
their belief “that now is the defining moment for the Iraqi govern-
ment to disarm and cease its negative and dilatory attitude that en-
courages the suspicion of the presence of weapons of mass destruc-
tion on its territory.”56 
Panama’s contributions to the coalition remain disputed to this 
day.57 Although neither Panama nor the U.S. ever specified how the 
former would contribute to the coalition, data compiled by ProCon58 
suggests that such contribution was limited to political support. 
There is no reliable evidence proving that Panama gave any type of 
military, logistical or intelligence support, or even humanitarian 
aid.59 
The earliest expression of Panama’s political support to the Co-
alition is found in a public statement of March, 2003, in which the 
then-President Moscoso said to the U.S. government, “my govern-
ment understands your decision to grant to the Iraqi people the 
                                                                                                             
 53 Panamá se suma a aliados en Irak [Panama joins allies in Iraq], EL 
MERCURIO (Chile), March 24, 2003, http://www.emol.com/noticias/internac-
ional/2003/03/24/107964/panama-se-suma-a-aliados-en-irak.html. 
 54 Critican apoyo Centroamericano al ataque a Irak [Critics to the Central-
American support to the attack against Iraq], LOS ANDES (Argentina), (March 
18, 2003), http://archivo.losandes.com.ar/notas/2003/3/18/un-292581.asp. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Accord Id. (citing reactions from Panamanian political figures). 
 58 Coalition Forces in Iraq, PROCON.ORG (September 1, 2010), 
http://usiraq.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000677; ProCon.org, 
Country Participation in US-led Coalition in Iraq (June 27, 2008), 
http://usiraq.procon.org/view.additional-resource.php?resourceID=700. 
 59 David Morrison, Who’s who in the Coalition of the Willing, LABOUR & 
TRADE UNION REVIEW (May 2003), http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/iraq/
coalition-of-willing.htm (all things considered, some member States such as Pan-
ama were only “publicly committed” with the goals of the coalition). 
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chance to enjoy democracy, peace and respect for human rights.”60 
Records suggest that after December 2003, Panama withdrew from 
the coalition alongside twelve other States.61 
ii. The 2003 Iraq War as an International Armed Conflict 
The Operation “Iraqi Freedom” carried out by the U.S.-led coa-
lition to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein and disarm Iraq of its 
alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) can be con-
sidered an International Armed Conflict (“IAC”). According to 
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“GCs”), an 
IAC is any “armed conflict, which may arise between two or more 
of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not rec-
ognized by one of them.”62 In the present case, the U.S., the United 
Kingdom, Australia and other member states of the coalition, which 
contributed to the offensive phase of the invasion, were parties to 
the GCs prior to the initiation of hostilities.63 Moreover, Iraq ratified 
                                                                                                             
 60 Press Release, The White House, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Statement of 
Support from Coalition (March 26, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release – Statement 
of Support]. 
 61 Coalition Forces in Iraq, PROCON.ORG (September 1, 2010), http://usiraq.
procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000677. 
 62 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
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the four GCs in February 14, 1956.64 The exercise of military hos-
tilities between the two contending sides was undeniable.65 There-
fore, the conflict’s initial phase (invasion and occupation) consti-
tuted an IAC. 
After the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the UNSC recognized 
the United Kingdom and the U.S. as occupying powers through res-
olution 1483 adopted on May 22, 2003. After the end of the occu-
pation, the newly established Iraqi government invited U.S. forces 
to remain in Iraq’s territory under a Status of Forcers Agreement 
(“SOFA”).66 After the U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, a 
conflict of sectarian character escalated, mostly between Sunni and 
Shia groups, spreading to neighboring Syria and radicalizing the 
Syrian Civil War.67 
c. The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and the Current 
Situation in Iraq and Syria 
With the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(“ISIL” - a former Al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq) in Iraqi territory and 
its expansion to neighboring Syria, the situation in the Middle East 
reached a historical peak in regards to violations of human rights, 
IHL, and the rule of law.68  In 2014, ISIL exercised significant con-
trol over portions of Syrian and Iraqi territory.69 The situation in 
Syria has worsened given the ongoing civil war between Bashar Al-
Assad’s autocratic regime and the dismembered rebel forces.70 The 
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presence of Russian and Iranian forces and non-state actors such as 
Hezbollah further complicates the current situation.71 
After considering the situation in Iraq and Syria, then-U.S. Pres-
ident Barack Obama announced on September 10, 2014, the for-
mation of a broad international coalition to defeat ISIL, emphasiz-
ing: “our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, 
ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strat-
egy.”72 Later, announcing that the coalition would act in accordance 
with “five mutually reinforcing lines of effort,” which include: 
providing military support to partners; impeding the flow of foreign 
fighters; stopping ISIL’s financing and funding; addressing the hu-
manitarian crisis in the region; and exposing ISIL’s true nature.73 
The legal argument for this global coalition’s resort to armed 
force seems unexplained at first glance. Prior to the commencement 
of the air-strike campaign by the U.S.-led coalition, a letter dated 
September 23, 2014 from the then-U.S. Permanent Representative 
to the U.N., Samantha Power to the former U.N. Secretary General, 
Ban Ki-Moon, provides an interesting legal rationale for the coali-
tion’s activities.74 According to Ambassador Power, the U.S. and its 
allies are acting in exercise of the right to collective self-defense in 
favor of the Iraqi Government and only against ISIL.75 The letter 
states that “Iraq has asked the [U.S.] to lead international efforts to 
strike ISIL sites and military strongholds in Syria in order to end the 
continuing attacks on Iraq, to protect Iraqi citizens, and ultimately 
to enable and arm Iraqi forces to perform their task of regaining con-
trol of the Iraqi borders.”76 Furthermore, the letter clarifies that the 
actions of the U.S. and its allies in Syria are directed only against 
ISIL and because the Syrian Government is “unwilling or unable to 
prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.”77 
                                                                                                             
 71 Id. at 1, 35. 
 72 The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/seci/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2017). 
 73 Id. 
 74 U.N. SCOR, Letter dated 23 Sept. 2014 from the Permanent Representative 
of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter U.S.-U.N. Letter]. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See, e.g., Id.; Marty Lederman, The War Powers Resolution and Article 51 
Letters Concerning Use of Force in Syria Against ISIL and the Khorasan Group 
2017] PANAMA'S PRACTICE AND THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY 15 
 
i. Panama and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL 
Panama is part of this “Global Coalition” alongside sixty-eight 
other states and four intergovernmental organizations (the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Arab League 
and Interpol).78 By way of a press release dated February 5, 2015, 
Panama’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the country’s de-
cision to join the coalition against ISIL.79 Despite failing to specify 
the nature of its involvement, Panama stated that it had made such a 
decision without compromising its principles of being a peace-lov-
ing nation that promotes dialogue and peaceful coexistence between 
peoples.80 After several months, another press release specified that 
Panama’s involvement is focused in stopping ISIL’s financing and 
funding,81 also asserting that it was not contributing to the coali-
tions’ military activities and hinted at the possibility of providing 
humanitarian aid to civilians displaced by the conflict.82 Nonethe-
less, as early as 2016, Newsweek listed Panama among the “coali-
tion members providing unspecified support.”83 Moreover, the coa-
lition’s own website fails to specify the type of support that Panama 
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is providing.84 While Panama has consistently clarified that its sup-
port to the coalition is non-military in character and mostly limited 
to countering the financing of ISIL, it remains difficult to reconcile 
this position with the factual reality. 
As specified by its own website, the Global Coalition is unique 
in its membership, scope and commitment.85 It has objectives that 
go beyond the military campaign.86 Nevertheless, it is quite hard to 
separate these non-military objectives with the military component 
of the Coalition, when its main objective is both the ideological and 
military defeat of ISIL. Panama, by joining the Global Coalition, 
expressed its support for this ultimate end and consequently en-
dorsed, directly or indirectly, the U.S.-led airstrikes in both Iraq and 
Syria. 
It is relevant to note that besides the goal of providing military 
support to allies, all the other lines of effort can be accomplished by 
complying with pre-existing international commitments - including 
binding international instruments.87  Binding UNSC Resolutions, 
adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, impose on all mem-
ber-States of the U.N. the obligation to undertake efforts to prevent 
the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria, and prevent the financ-
ing of terrorist groups, inter alia ISIL.88 
With regard to efforts focused on addressing the humanitarian 
crisis in the region, it can be argued that all States are authorized to 
provide humanitarian assistance to civilians and hors de combat in 
armed conflicts. This authorization is derived from the IHL custom-
ary rule governing “access for humanitarian relief to civilians in 
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need,” which is applicable to both international and non-interna-
tional armed conflicts.89 Although humanitarian relief functions are 
primarily exercised by humanitarian organizations such as the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), nothing expressly 
prohibits States from providing such assistance.90 In any event, the 
assisting entity or State would need the consent of the State con-
cerned, and the assistance provided must be both impartial and non-
discriminatory.91 Lastly, this authorization could also find its basis 
in the duty to ensure respect, protection, and human treatment for 
individuals no longer or not participating in hostilities derived from 
common article 3 of the GCs.92 
Considering that the coalition lacks a founding legal document, 
it is challenging to ascertain when one of its leading member-States 
is acting in its personal capacity or on behalf of the broader mem-
bership. This point is illustrated by the recent Gulf diplomatic crisis 
were some States, inter alia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emir-
ates and Bahrain (all members of the Coalition) broke diplomatic 
ties with Qatar (also a member) for supposedly financing terrorism 
(one of the objectives which the coalition is supposed to counter).93 
Responding to this, the U.S. Air Force’s Central Command spokes-
person stressed that the U.S. “and the coalition are grateful to the 
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Qataris for their long-standing support of our presence and their en-
during commitment to regional security.”94 In this sense, it seems 
difficult to reconcile the ‘apparent’ collective position of the coali-
tion members with actions and reasoning of Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. 
ii. The Coalition’s Conflict with ISIL as a Non-International 
Armed Conflict 
The characterization of the Coalition’s ongoing conflict with 
ISIL is a complicated affair given the plurality of actors involved 
(State and non-State).95 If we rely on Ambassador Power’s ra-
tionale,96 the conflict with ISIL can be categorized as a non-interna-
tional armed conflict (“NIAC”) with a transnational character. 
Within the meaning of Common Article 3 to the GCs, which reads 
that NIACs are “armed conflicts not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”.97 
This definition explains that if a conflict within the territory of a 
State party to the GC is not an IAC, i.e. between two or more of the 
High Contracting Parties of the GCs, it could prima facie be consid-
ered a NIAC. 
In the case at hand, the situation in Syria and Iraq can be quali-
fied separately and prima facie as NIACs, as both States are facing 
a military threat from non-State actors within their own territory 
(ISIL in the case of Iraq, and ISIL and other non-State actors in 
Syria).98 As mentioned before, Iraq is a party to the GCs since 
1956,99 while Syria has been a State party since November 2, 
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1953.100 Therefore, drawing upon GCs’ mutually exclusive defini-
tions of IACs and NIACs, both conflicts could be characterized as 
NIACs. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) in the jurisdiction phase of Prosecutor v. Tadic deter-
mined that a NIAC exists “whenever there is . . . protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.”101 In Tadic, the 
ICTY stated that for the purposes of distinguishing between armed 
conflicts (within the meaning of Common Article 3) and other less 
serious forms violence (internal disturbances and tensions), the test 
provided by Article 1 of Additional Protocol II (“AP II”) is ac-
cepted.102 This test provides that a conflict can be characterized as a 
NIAC whenever the following criteria are met: the hostilities must 
reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties to the conflict 
must possess organized military forces.103 
The conflicts in Syria and Iraq also seem to fall beneath the 
scope of the more restrictive definition of NIAC provided by AP 
II.104 AP II introduces, inter alia, a requirement of territorial control 
for the non-state actor party to the conflict, in order to carry out “sus-
tained and concerted military operations.”105 Given that Syria and 
Iraq are not parties to AP II,106 its direct application by way of treaty 
law remains questionable.107 Nonetheless, most of AP II provisions 
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are considered part of customary international law,108 or applied as 
a matter of policy. 
As recognized in Ambassador Power’s letter, the Iraqi govern-
ment does not control its borders and it is subject to “continuing” 
attacks from ISIL.109  The letter also acknowledges that ISIL pos-
sesses several strongholds in Syria.110 Besides this letter, other 
sources recognize the control that ISIL exercises over significant 
parts of Iraqi and Syrian territory.111 The fact that ISIL exercises 
control over portions of territory and constantly engages in military 
hostilities with different forces provides support to the theory that 
both conflicts have reached the threshold of a NIAC.112 
iii. The Coalition’s Activities in Syria as an International 
Armed Conflict 
As already stated, an IAC exists whenever one State resorts to 
any form of armed force against another State. When an interna-
tional coalition uses force against a non-State armed group within 
the territory of another State, with the explicit consent of the territo-
rial State, there is no IAC.113 However, if the consent of the State in 
question is absent then the conflict might be considered an IAC.114 
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Dapo Akande and Marko Milanovic argue that, absent the consent 
of the territorial State, the active exercise of hostilities between a 
foreign State and a non-State actor in the territory of another State 
(the territorial State) would activate the application of laws govern-
ing IACs between the foreign State and the non-State actor.115 
Akande in one of his scholarly dispositions explains that this posi-
tion finds support, inter alia, in scholarly writings and the jurispru-
dence of national and international tribunals,116 including the Inter-
national Court of Justice.117 
Currently, the U.S.-led coalition engages in attacks against ISIL 
in Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian government (led 
by Al-Assad). Recently, the U.S. executed a punitive airstrike 
against a Syrian air force base.118 The rationale offered was that the 
attack on regime troops within Syrian jurisdiction was justified be-
cause it intended to punish and deter the future use of chemical 
weapons in the context of the Syrian civil war.119 In light of these 
new facts and the legality of the aforementioned rationale, could the 
situation between Syria and the U.S. be characterized as an IAC? 
Notwithstanding the “unwilling or unable” doctrine, if Syria consid-
ers that the coalition’s ongoing airstrikes violate its sovereignty, the 
IAC claim may have a legal basis. 
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III. THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
Traditionally, the law of neutrality in IHL distinguishes between 
two types of States: neutral and belligerent.120 Belligerents States 
are those engaged in hostilities, while neutral States are those not 
taking part in hostilities.121  This part of IHL is governed by custom-
ary international law122 and the following conventions: The Hague 
Convention (V) on Neutral Powers in case of War on Land (1907)123 
and the Hague Convention (XIII) on Neutral Powers in Naval War 
(1907).124 
With the adoption of the U.N. Charter, the law of neutrality un-
derwent significant setbacks.125 One of the principles of the U.N. 
Charter requires all member States to provide assistance to the or-
ganization at all times and refrain from providing assistance to any 
State on which the U.N. is taking any type of action (preventive or 
enforcement).126 Moreover, Article 25 of the U.N. Charter estab-
lishes the binding character of UNSC resolutions on all member 
states, in particular the resolutions adopted under Chapter VII. If the 
Council dictates enforcement measures (including the resort to 
armed force) States are obliged to comply with them, notwithstand-
ing the laws of neutrality, i.e., the concept of neutrality as a “per-
missive legal status.”127 Reflecting on this, Maria Gavouneli notes 
that in the U.N. collective security system the idea of “neutral uni-
lateralism” remains foreign.128 She also recognizes that in the U.N. 
                                                                                                             
 120 COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 365. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 367. 
 123 The Hague Convention (V) on Neutral Powers in case of War on Land arts. 
5, 10. Oct. 18, 1907 [Hereinafter The Hague Convention (V)]. 
 124 The Hague Convention (XIII) on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
in Navel War art. 6, Oct. 18, 1907 [Hereinafter The Hague Convention (XIII)]. 
 125 COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 368-69. 
 126 U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶5. 
 127 See, e.g., THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 368-69; 
Neutrality, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/neu-
trality. 
 128 Maria Gavouneli, Neutrality – A Survivor?, 23 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 
267, 270 (2012). 
2017] PANAMA'S PRACTICE AND THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY 23 
 
system there will always be room for decentralized action.129 Ga-
vouneli concludes that in these few cases where “the UN member 
states fail to respond adequately and sufficiently in terms of both 
time and substance,”130 some fragments of the law of neutrality will 
play an auxiliary role in the law of armed conflict.131  The latter 
states that whenever the UNSC has not adopted any type of measure 
and where there is an armed conflict, the U.N. Member States are 
free to maintain their status as neutral powers.132 
A similar argument arises in the case of collective security ar-
rangements, such as the North Atlantic Treaty133 and the Rio 
Treaty,134 which establish that an armed attack against one Member 
State constitutes an armed attack against all members. In such cases 
and if the treaty in question is invoked, States’ parties are theoreti-
cally obliged to provide assistance and exercise the right to individ-
ual or collective self-defense against the aggressor in accordance 
with the provisions established in the U.N. Charter.135 If the States 
concerned acted in accordance with their treaty commitments by ex-
ercising individual or collective self-defense, they would compro-
mise their neutral status under IHL.136 In the absence of collective 
self-defense arrangements, States are entitled to maintain their neu-
tral status, as long as the UNSC is not seized on the matter and has 
not determined the existence of an act of aggression and adopted 
appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.137 
Hence, contemporary jus ad bellum directly affects the laws of 
neutrality. Whenever the UNSC is seized on the matter by either 
implementing enforcement measures or authorizing the exercise of 
individual and collective self-defense, the law of neutrality remains 
inapplicable to all the States concerned.138 However, if the Council 
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has failed to act, the law of neutrality becomes applicable as a set of 
auxiliary rules.139 Additionally, the law of neutrality is only appli-
cable to IACs and certain NIACS (belligerency recognition), as con-
temporary international law does not recognize insurgent groups as 
neutral powers.140 
Recent developments in IHL have raised claims that a new “cat-
egory” of States has emerged in the context of armed conflicts.141 
The III Geneva Convention (“GC III”) introduces in Article 4(B)(2) 
the expression “neutral or non-belligerent Power,” which entails the 
existence of a new category of States in armed conflicts: the non-
belligerent State. Yves Sandoz finds no explanation for “this excep-
tional addition of the expression ‘non-belligerent’ after ‘neutral’ 
powers.”142 Moreover, Sandoz also signals that the “non-belligerent 
Power” concept was not discussed in the 1949 Diplomatic Confer-
ence or in the 1948 International Red Cross Conference.143 Accord-
ing to Sandoz, the origin of this term can be found in the 1947 Con-
ference of Government Experts, where the French Delegate intro-
duced the term ‘non-belligerent’ States, with specific reference to 
WWII.144 Finally, Sandoz concludes that the term ‘neutral’ States 
covers all States not participating in a given armed conflict, while 
the term “non-belligerent” lacks factual meaning for interpreting GC 
III.145 
As already explained, the law of neutrality survived the U.N. 
Charter and remains applicable in cases where the latter is not im-
plemented. The ICRC has recognized that in cases of collective self-
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defense and UNSC enforcement actions, the U.N. Charter provi-
sions prevail over the laws of neutrality.146 Below, we will analyze 
the categories of States, within the context of the laws of neutrality, 
which are listed as follows: neutral, non-belligerent, belligerent and 
co-belligerent States. 
a. Neutral States 
Lassa Oppenheim describes neutrality as “an attitude of impar-
tiality deliberately taken up by a State not implicated in a war; neu-
trality cannot begin before the outbreak of war.”147 Oppenheim also 
states, “the duty of impartiality compromises to-day abstention from 
any active or passive co-operation with belligerents.”148 He con-
cludes that “the duties of neutrality are incumbent upon [States] as 
long as they do not expressis verbis or by unmistakable acts declare 
that they will be parties to the war.”149 
Before the advent of the U.N., the practice of States was to notify 
third States of the initiation of the conflict in order to enable them to 
adopt the necessary attitude of impartiality.150 However, notifica-
tions were never considered legally necessary.151 In the U.N. era, 
notifications have been abandoned as the use of force in contraven-
tion with the U.N. Charter has been proscribed.152 The rules govern-
ing the neutrality status of States are binding as part of treaty and 
customary international law.153 
The ICRC has compiled a glossary that provides for IHL key 
terms’ definitions in which “neutral State” is defined as a “State that 
has chosen to be neutral either permanently or only in a particular 
IAC, or in certain cases in a NIAC.”154 The glossary also explains 
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that neutrality does not imply ideological impartiality; it does not 
require the State to abstain from showing its preference in regard to 
another State.155 However, a neutral state may not openly participate 
in hostilities.156 The State should also abstain from lending assis-
tance to belligerents, recruiting troops for belligerents, allowing 
third parties to do so in its territory, or supply the belligerents with 
military equipment or with military intelligence.157 
According to the V Hague Convention, a neutral State must en-
sure respect for its neutrality and if necessary may resort to force in 
case of any violations in its territory.158 The ICRC notes that a neu-
tral State must treat opposing belligerents with impartiality, which 
creates a prohibition on discrimination.159 By non-discrimination, 
the ICRC forbids differential treatment of belligerents in the specific 
context of armed conflict; it does not affect preexisting commercial 
relations.160Additionally, the XIII Hague Convention provides that 
“the supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power 
to a belligerent Power, of warships, ammunition, or war material of 
any kind whatever, is forbidden.”161 
Andrea Gioia considers that duties of neutral States can be qual-
ified as duties of abstention (from providing military aid to belliger-
ents), prevention (defend its territory’s inviolability), and impartial-
ity (towards belligerents on sensitive diplomatic, commercial and 
political issues).162 Gioia asserts that such duties stem from the gen-
eral principle of impartiality and constitute the core of neutrality.163 
Robert Kolb and Richard Hyde argue that if the neutral state vi-
olates its aforementioned duties, it loses the entitlement to be treated 
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as a neutral.164 For example, if it violates the duty of prevention, 
which requires active protection of the inviolability of its territory, 
“it will expose itself to belligerent action on its territory to safeguard 
the essential interests and rights of the aggrieved belligerent.”165  
The U.N. General Assembly in its Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the 
“Definition of Aggression” mentions among the acts that qualify as 
acts of aggression, regardless of a declaration of war, “the action of 
a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal 
of another State, to be used by the other State for perpetrating an act 
of aggression against a third State.”166 This list of acts of aggression 
provided by Resolution 3314 is considered to reflect customary in-
ternational law.167 In this sense, the duty of prevention permeates to 
jus ad bellum given that non-compliance under the specific circum-
stances underlined by Resolution 3314 constitutes casus belli.168 
However, in cases not involving the use of a neutral State’s ter-
ritory and the exercise of the right of self-defense, the assertion that 
the aggrieved belligerent can resort to force remains dubious at best. 
In contemporary international law, a violation of the laws of neu-
trality gives rise to the legitimate right of the aggrieved State to take 
reprisals and countermeasures.169 Nonetheless, this right does not 
justify any action contrary to the prohibition on the use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations.170 
Heller explains that the relationship between the law of neutral-
ity and jus ad bellum is defined by the different kinds of violations 
of neutrality.171 These violations can be classified in two instances: 
situations where the neutral State affirmatively supports one of the 
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belligerents, and where the neutral State is unwilling or unable to 
prevent a belligerent from using its territory for hostile acts (duty of 
prevention).172 With regard to the former, the law of neutrality re-
quires States to refrain from materially supporting one of the bellig-
erents.173 Nonetheless, providing material support to one of the bel-
ligerents does not automatically end the State’s neutral status.174 The 
affected State may be entitled to reparations or prone to overlook 
this violation of the law of neutrality.175 However, the mere violation 
of the law of neutrality would not authorize the aggrieved belligerent 
to use of force.176 
b. Non-Belligerent States 
Although certain authors reject the existence of non-belligerent 
States as sub-category of States in the context of armed conflicts,177 
others defend its existence. Particularly, Gioia articulates that non-
belligerency is an intermediate position between neutrality and bel-
ligerency,178 and that States may resort to such position without im-
mediately violating international law.179 Gioia also explains that 
“non-belligerency” or “qualified neutrality” can be employed for sit-
uations where a State does not wish to enter the conflict on the side 
of one belligerent, but at the same time does not choose to be bound 
by the traditional laws of neutrality.180 Additionally, Gioia argues 
that non-belligerent States, though not bound by neutrality obliga-
tions, enjoy some of the rights that neutral states enjoy vis-à-vis bel-
ligerents. Among such rights is the inviolability of a State’s territory, 
which does not flow from the law of neutrality but from the U.N. 
Charter.181 
In regards to actions of non-belligerent States favoring belliger-
ents, the consequences flowing from such actions remain unclear. 
Gioia asserts that “un-neutral” behavior from neutral States, though 
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themselves not constituting acts of aggression may be seen as 
amounting to complicity with one of the belligerents.182 This ra-
tionale is applied mutatis mutandis to non-belligerent states.183 Nev-
ertheless, Gioia argues that in those circumstances, the aggrieved 
belligerent State may not justify its actions by virtue of its right to 
self-defense nor take lawful reprisals against the non-belligerent 
State, as the laws of neutrality do not bind the latter.184 In any event, 
the law of reprisals does not justify the resort to armed force.185 The 
only exception allowing for the use force seems to be the use of a 
neutral State’s territory by one of the belligerents to conduct military 
operations against another belligerent.186 
Lastly, it is necessary to emphasize that as a matter of legal prin-
ciple and in view of relevant State practice, the concept of a “non-
belligerent” State lacks factual legal basis.187 The sub-category of 
non-belligerent States in armed conflicts was and should still be con-
sidered a “euphemism designed to cover violations of international 
law in the field of neutral obligations.”188 
c. Belligerent States 
The term ‘belligerent State’ is defined as a State engaged in an 
armed conflict, or more simply as a State waging hostilities.189 
Treaty and customary international law govern the conduct of bel-
ligerents.190 It is also agreed that belligerency is defined in contrast 
                                                                                                             
 182 Neutrality and Non-Belligerency, supra note 141, at 101-03. 
 183 Id. at 102-03. 
 184 Id. at 76-77. 
 185 Id. at 101. 
 186 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 166, annex, art 3(f). 
 187 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Benevolent Third States in International 
Armed Conflicts: The Myth of the Irrelevance of the Law of Neutrality, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE 
FAULTLINES 543, 555-56 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007). 
 188 H.W. Briggs, Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal, 34 AJIL 569, 569-
587 (1940). 
 189 Nathalie Weizmann, Associated Forces and Co-belligerency, JUST 
SECURITY (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/20344/isil-aumf-
forces-co-belligerency/. 
 190 See, YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 4-12 (2004). 
30 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1 
 
with the laws of neutrality, which provides important guidance for 
determining when a State becomes belligerent or co-belligerent.191 
Nathalie Weizmann explains that in accordance with the law of 
neutrality, a State becomes a belligerent in an armed conflict when-
ever it declares war against another State, participates in hostilities 
to a significant extent, or engages in systematic or substantial viola-
tions of its neutrality duties of impartiality and non-participation.192 
For the purposes of the present study, it seems appropriate to not 
consider declarations of war as an action that provides for a state of 
belligerency. After 1945, declarations of war ceased to be instru-
ments for proclaiming de jure existence of war. 193 At the present 
time, for a state of war to exist, one of the parties to the conflict has 
to make its intentions clear by actually commencing hostilities or 
making extensive preparations.194 
d.. Co-Belligerent States 
Whenever two or more States are engaged in an armed struggle 
against a common enemy, the doctrine of co-belligerency becomes 
applicable.195 The term ‘co-belligerent’ is generally understood as a 
State fighting with another Power against a common enemy.196 Ba-
sically, the term involves two or more States undertaking joint op-
erations against a rival entity in the context of an armed conflict.197  
Traditionally, the doctrine of co-belligerency has been applied ex-
clusively to IACs.198 Nonetheless, some of its features have been 
applied to NIACs. For example, the pooling of military resources in 
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favor of one of the parties of a NIAC has been regarded as a form of 
co-belligerency.199 
Different authors understand the term ‘co-belligerent’ as synon-
ymous with “ally.”200 The U.S. Manual for Military Commission 
defines co-belligerent as “any State or armed force joining and di-
rectly engaged with the [U.S.] in hostilities or directly supporting 
hostilities against a common enemy.”201 Other groups of scholars 
focus on establishing an effective test for co-belligerency. In a 2004 
memo, Jack Goldsmith wrote “mere participation in any aspect of 
the occupation itself will not always suffice to constitute co-bellig-
erency, especially when a State’s specific contribution has no direct 
nexus with belligerent or hostile activities.”202 He then concluded: 
“the determination whether a State is a ‘co-belligerent’ by virtue of 
its participation  . . .  turns on whether the participation is closely 
related to ‘hostilities.’”203 
Gioia agrees with Goldsmith by stating, “under the traditional 
law of neutrality, a violation of neutrality obligations did not auto-
matically make the State concerned a co-belligerent.”204 Morris 
Greenspan proposes a very narrow test for determining co-belliger-
ency: the State has to be in “fully fledged belligerent fighting in as-
sociation with one or more belligerent powers.”205 Goldsmith and 
Curtis Bradley present a co-belligerency threshold for neutral states, 
which is surpassed whenever they engage in systematic or signifi-
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cant violations of their duties under the law of neutrality, i.e., pre-
vention, abstention and impartiality.206 Greenspan, Bradley, and 
Goldsmith seem to offer more narrow tests, focused on the partici-
pation in hostilities or systematic/significant violations of the law of 
neutrality.207 The ICTY’s jurisprudence also seems to favor the par-
ticipation in hostilities approach.208 In the Blaskic case, the Court 
hinted that joint military operations were the key for establishing the 
status of co-belligerent.209 
Christopher Greenwood goes even further in arguing that a State 
not originally participating in an armed conflict would only commit 
an act of war and become a party to the conflict by “giving direct 
support to the military operations of one of the belligerents.”210 He 
excludes from this type of material assistance the provision of finan-
cial, intelligence and political support.211 Similarly, Michael Bothe 
and Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg claim that the fact that a neutral 
State provides “unneutral services,” i.e. rendering assistance to one 
of the belligerents, is not sufficient to justify the use of force against 
it.212 
In contrast, the former U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, offered in one of 
his reports a contemporary-broad test for co-belligerency.213 In 
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2013, Heyns stressed, “co-belligerency is a concept that applies to 
international armed conflicts and entails a sovereign State becoming 
a party to a conflict, either through formal or informal processes.214 
A treaty of alliance may be concluded as a formal process, while an 
informal process could involve providing assistance to or establish-
ing a common cause with belligerent forces.”215 
Jens Ohlin proposes another interesting test, in which he argues 
that in accordance with the traditional doctrine of co-belligerency 
(which stems from the law of neutrality) a belligerent State must 
give a third State the opportunity to declare its neutrality before de-
claring it a co-belligerent.216 If the original state in question refuses 
to make the declaration, it can be considered a co-belligerent (a party 
to the conflict) and therefore a lawful subject of an attack.217 Ohlin 
and Heyns’ tests constitute the more broadly construed proposals, 
presumably extending co-belligerent status to States not directly 
participating in hostilities.218 
After briefly examining some of the abovementioned positions, 
Weizmann concludes that the following criterion is the most useful 
for recognizing co-belligerent States: the State has to provide “sys-
tematic or substantial supply of war materials, military troops, or 
financial support in association, cooperation, assistance or common 
cause with another belligerent.”219 This approach seems to take a 
middle ground between the broad and narrow tests mentioned 
above. 
As showcased by the differing views among legal scholars, the 
threshold between violations of the law of neutrality and the co-bel-
ligerency status is unclear. While some authors rely on the State’s 
direct involvement in hostilities, others seem to rest on more subjec-
tive elements such as refusal to declare its neutrality or the estab-
lishment of a common cause. The following section explores 
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whether Panama became a co-belligerent state or maintained its sta-
tus of a neutral power by joining the aforementioned coalitions. 
IV. PANAMA AS A CO-BELLIGERENT OR NEUTRAL STATE? 
The underlying fact that contributes to our analysis is that in each 
of the military coalitions’ subjects of the present study (WWII, the 
Coalition of the Willing, and the Global Coalition to counter ISIL), 
Panama did not contribute to military operations. Although Panama 
failed, at times, to specify the nature of its involvement, it remains 
difficult to claim that it was directly engaged in hostilities.220 This 
fact rules out the possibility of Panama being characterized ab initio 
as a belligerent State. Therefore, the question posed is whether Pan-
ama is/was a neutral or co-belligerent state given its presumed vio-
lations of the law of neutrality. 
By joining the above-mentioned international coalitions, Pan-
ama openly expressed its support for one of the warring belliger-
ents.221  This amounted to a violation of the duty of impartiality. The 
fact that the coalitions’ ultimate goal was the military defeat of a 
common enemy (the Axis Powers, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and 
ISIL, respectively) adds to the gravity of the neutrality law viola-
tions. In the case of the Coalition to Counter ISIL, the existence of 
an asymmetric conflict between the Coalition and ISIL would trans-
late into the inapplicability of the law of neutrality, as ISIL cannot 
be regarded as a belligerent. However, as noted above, Syria could 
plausibly argue that the ongoing operations of the Coalition within 
its territory are part of an ongoing IAC, as that it deems such opera-
tions unlawful and in contravention with the U.N. Charter. 
Applying the co-belligerence tests specified in the previous sec-
tions to Panama’s actions under the abovementioned coalitions 
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could give rise, in some cases, to plausible claims of co-belliger-
ency. Particularly, Panama’s involvement in all of these coalitions 
fits perfectly into Ohlin and Heyns’ tests. In joining the coalitions, 
Panama established a common cause with its members and failed to 
declare its neutrality. In contrast, Greenspan, Goldsmith, Green-
wood, Bothe, Heintschel, and Weizmann’s proposals rule out the co-
belligerency claim in two of the cases (Coalition of the Willing and 
against ISIL) because of the fact that Panama is/was not actively 
involved in the exercise of military hostilities. Moreover, the ab-
sence of factual evidence of any type of financial contribution to the 
war aim adds to the claim against Panama’s co-belligerency. 
Which of these two schools of thought should prevail? Existing 
international norms seem to be inclined towards the narrow test of 
co-belligerency.222 Specifically, the peremptory norm against the 
use of force seems to deem Ohlin and Heyns’ tests inapplicable. Ab-
sent an act of aggression or a UNSC enforcement action, any resort 
to armed force against a sovereign State would constitute a violation 
of the prohibition on the use of force, an erga omnes223 and jus co-
gens norm.224 Violations of the laws of neutrality authorize the ag-
grieved State to resort to lawful countermeasures and reprisals.225 
However, countermeasures or reprisals that include the use of force 
against neutral states are considered unlawful.226 Hence, Ohlin and 
Heyns’ tests should be interpreted in accordance with the jus cogens 
prohibition on the use of force. A State’s incorporation to a coalition 
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does not constitute an armed attack or an act of aggression within 
the meaning U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314.227 
In the three cases put forth, Panama was a co-belligerent in one 
of the conflicts and a neutral state violating its duty of impartiality 
in the other two. During WWII, Panama was a co-belligerent be-
cause: 1) the lege lata established that by declaring war against an-
other State, a country could become part of an armed conflict,228 2) 
it was part of a military coalition against the Axis Powers,229 and 3) 
it had leased its territory to the U.S. for military purposes, thus ef-
fectively contributing to the war efforts.230 The fact that Panama vol-
untarily agreed to lease its territory for the conduct of defensive mil-
itary preparations and the transit of troops to and from the Pacific 
and Atlantic fronts constituted a violation of its neutral duty of pre-
vention, which exposed the territory to belligerent action from the 
aggrieved belligerent. Even today, in similar circumstances, the in-
ternational law would find this action by Panama inconsistent with 
its obligations under jus ad bellum, particularly in light of UNGA 
Resolution 3314.231 
In the other two cases, Panama can only be considered a neutral 
State. The country did not provide any type of military or financial 
aid to the war efforts, and it did not allow belligerent factions to use 
its territory.232  By joining the Coalition of the Willing and the 
Global anti-ISIL coalition, Panama violated its duty of impartiality. 
However, it is very difficult to argue that these violations were sig-
nificant or systematic in any form, as it only involved an expression 
of political support for the coalition’s military actions. The fact that 
Panama openly chose a side in each conflict could have given rise 
to the use of countermeasures by the aggrieved States (Iraq in 2003 
and Syria in 2015 onwards) if the regimes of such States considered 
that they were or are subject to foreign military intervention by the 
US-led coalitions. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In 2007, Heintschel von Heinegg raised similar claims as the 
ones presented in this paper in regards to Germany’s violations of 
the laws of neutrality in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(2003).233 Although not a member of the coalition, Germany al-
lowed and assisted the U.S. armed forces in the transport of military 
equipment and supplies through German territory.234 Heintschel von 
Heinegg argues that Germany violated the laws of neutrality; the 
fact that Iraq failed to react is irrelevant.235 According to the German 
scholar, 
States should therefore think twice before departing from the es-
sentials of neutrality. If they were to be confronted with a belligerent 
far more powerful than Iraq in a future conflict, the law of neutrality 
could prove to be the only legal order effectively protecting their 
legitimate interests as States not taking part in the conflict.236 
This paper aimed at portraying a very troubling practice by Pan-
ama consisting of joining international coalitions without measuring 
possible international legal consequences in the context of both jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello. The fact that Iraq and Syria failed to react 
to Panama’s violations of the laws of neutrality is irrelevant as a 
matter of law.  Panama may have weighed the political advantages 
of joining the coalition against the legal and practical risks. In this 
sense, as a matter of policy, Panama seems have concluded that an 
attack from Iraq or Syria was highly unlikely at the time. In the fu-
ture and prior to joining a coalition involved in an armed conflict, 
Panama should examine the possible legal consequences of such ac-
tion. 
It would also be relevant to learn from the experiences of other 
States. For reflection and correction we should examine Costa 
Rica’s example. In 2004, after the country joined the Coalition of 
the Willing (2003), the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme 
Court declared such act null, void, and unconstitutional as it affected 
the country’s neutrality, constituted an unlawful declaration of war 
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(absent the approval of the Congress who has the exclusive compe-
tence for declaring war), and was contrary to relevant norms of in-
ternational law.237 The Court instructed the Executive Power to re-
quest that the United States exclude Costa Rica from the list of Co-
alition member States. Subsequently, Costa Rica’s Foreign Minister 
asked Washington to remove its country from the coalition’s “list” 
through a diplomatic note.238 
For restraint, Indonesia is the perfect model. In January 2016, 
Indonesia was victim of a terrorist attack from ISIL.239 Despite this, 
a diplomatic official stated that it was very unlikely that Indonesia 
would join the anti-ISIL coalition.240 The diplomat stressed that In-
donesia’s contribution to the battle against ISIL was centered in win-
ing the ideological struggle against violent extremism.241 Addition-
ally, he said that U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relations would continue 
to focus on the exchange of intelligence and the continuation of po-
litical cooperation in international forums.242 
Countries without military forces and other victims of terrorism 
have shown more care for the legal consequences of joining an in-
ternational coalition than Panama. In the case of the anti-ISIL coali-
tion, if Panama wanted to contribute to the global fight against ter-
rorism, compliance with several UNSC resolutions requiring coun-
tries to stop the flow of foreign combatants and the financing of ISIL 
would have sufficed. If Panama intended to provide humanitarian 
assistance to victims of ISIL attacks, it could have done so inde-
pendently of its affiliation to the coalition. If Panama wanted to ex-
pose ISIL’s true nature, a more proactive role in international fo-
rums dealing with the subject matter would have been sufficient. 
Panama, as a small and peaceful State must comport with inter-
national law. Considering that it is one of the few States in the world 
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without a standing army and with a Canal that it has pledged to 
maintain neutral, it must exercise the utmost caution and restraint 
when taking delicate strategic and political decisions - such as join-
ing a coalition with a military component. So far, there have been 
no consequences for Panama’s actions in the cases presented above. 
However, in the near future, Panama may find that States are not so 
benevolent with violations of neutrality. In such cases, the best de-
fense is maintaining and protecting the neutrality of the Canal strictu 
sensu, fully complying with UNSC resolutions and implementing 
the applicable collective security arrangements. 
 
